Kauffman on the Philosophy of Mind
The theoretical biologist, Stuart Kauffman, argues that quantum physics can explain the existence of free will.
Stuart Kauffman is a theoretical
biologist and author from the University of Calgary in Canada who has
pioneered the study of complexity in relation to biological systems.
As a theoretical biologist, it must be hard to avoid the
biggest outstanding problem of them all: what is the nature of
consciousness? And today, Kauffman takes a crack at it along with
five others related to the philosophy of mind.
He
begins by mapping out his territory: “If mind depends upon
the specific physics of the mind-brains system, mind is, in part, a
matter for physicists.” Fair enough.
He then lists
the questions he hopes to tackle:
How does mind act on matter?
If mind does not act on matter is
mind a mere epiphenomenon?
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What might be the source of free
will?
What might be the source of a
responsible free will?
Why might it have been selectively
advantageous to evolve consciousness?
What “is” consciousness?
That’s an ambitious list. The gist of his answers is that mind is
a quantum phenomenon that produces a classical output that Kauffman says is the
source of free will. He adds that this classical output is nonrandom
and yet cannot be described by the laws of physics because, as the
quantum system decoheres, information is lost in a way that can never
be retrieved.
If true, that’s important because “if the
quantum-classical boundary can be non-random yet lawless, then no
algorithmic simulation of the world or ourselves can calculate the
real world, hence the evolutionary selective advantages for evolving
consciousness
to “know” it may be great”.
In
other words, consciousness is very useful for making sense of the
world which is why evolution selects for it.
He also says
this means we are not machines, although how he reaches this
conclusion isn’t clear. A more reasonable conclusion would be that we
are machines that span the quantum-classical divide.
In
any case, that clears up questions 1 to 5.
As for the biggie,
he says: “I make no progress on problem 6”
An honest answer for sure; but then why include it in the essay in
the first place?
Ref: arxiv.org/abs/0907.2494: Physics and Five Problems in the Philosophy of Mind
