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Another Vote Against Diebold

A new study commissioned by the Maryland legislature states that electronic voting machines bought by the state from Diebold for $55 million have such poor software and physical security that an election could be disrupted or even stolen, according to…

  • January 30, 2004

A new study commissioned by the Maryland legislature states that electronic voting machines bought by the state from Diebold for $55 million have such poor software and physical security that an election could be disrupted or even stolen, according to the New York Times. The study represents the first hands-on effort to hack these machines under conditions found in an election. The team, from consulting firm RABA Technologies in Columbia, MD, did say that the weaknesses could be addressed–at least preliminarily–in time for the state’s primary elections in March.

This is only one in a series of reports attacking the security of electronic voting machines, particularly those manufactured by Diebold Election Systems. Diebold’s machines are used statewide in Georgia as well as in several populous counties in Califonia, Texas, and Ohio. Stanford computer scientist David Dill, who is among the security experts asking for more stringent regulation of this new technology, explains his concerns in this TR interview.

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