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Without naming names, the GAO report cites instances in previous state elections in which the tallies from direct recording machines were open to tampering, the ballots themselves could be modified, locks were easy to pick, and power switches were exposed and unprotected. There were also breakdowns and cases of election officials who could not configure the machines. (Scores of election gaffs caused by direct recording machines are documented at www.votersunite.org, the website of a group of activists promoting fair elections.)
Mercuri and others also worry that direct-recording machines are vulnerable to human error. For example, the order of names on ballots is commonly rotated from ward to ward so that no candidate always has the coveted top slot. If a local programmer gets the names out of synch, though, suggests Mercuri, there might be no way to tell which votes were really cast for whom.
Mercuri would rather see jurisdictions use old-fashioned optical scanners instead of moving to direct-recording machines. In optical scanner systems, voters mark paper ballots with ink, then feed them into scanners. The paper ballots are collected in a bin inside the scanner, and can be hand-counted for an audit. In fact, optical scanner balloting is the most popular election technology in the United States, accounting for over 30 percent of the votes cast in 2004 (see table).
Rather than discarding the direct-recording machines they've bought, however, many jurisdictions have modified the tally printers inside the machines, which are normally used only after the polls have closed, to produce a "voter verifiable" paper audit trail. A person receives a ticket showing what votes he or she has just cast -- at least what the machine has registered. The ticket, which contains no identifying information about the voter, remains in the polling place for auditing purposes.
Of the 50 U.S. states, 30 have laws requiring that voting machines produce a voter-verifiable audit trail, or they have already converted to a system with a voter-verifiable paper trail through their purchasing decisions, says Pam Smith, nationwide coordinator for the nonprofit Verified Voting Foundation.
Others claim that these concerns about e-voting machines are blown out of proportion. According to Michael Kerr, director of the Election Technology Council in Arlington, VA, every maker of direct-recording machines provides some way to audit the functioning of its machines, such as an audit log that can be checked against the contents of working memory. “The 2004 elections were for the most part problem-free, except for some isolated instances of technology process training glitches,” he says. The council represents makers of direct-recording machines such as Advanced Voting Solutions, Diebold Election Systems, and Election Systems & Software.
A main reason for switching to direct-recording machines, Kerr says, was to avoid the expense of paper and ink, especially where ballots had to be supplied in many different languages. Changing the machines to produce a voter-verifiable paper trail re-introduces that expense, as well as costing $1,500-3,000 per machine to do the upgrade, he says.
Experts say that when it comes to voting machines, usability issues should be as much of a concern as security.
Guest (Owen N. Martinez)
Besides being more susceptible to tampering, electronic voting may scare a lot of voters that are not used to high technology, particularly minorities. I would recommend a mixed system, that will maintain a paper trail for good auditing of the election results, plus easy electronic voting, only after giving special training to voters about using high-tech voting machines.
Guest (R. Mercuri)
I found it interesting that the author chose to round down the Optical Scanner voting statistic from 39.8 (in the table) to 30% (in the article). Where I went to school, 39.8 rounds to 40%, but maybe thats not the way they do things at MIT. -) As it turns out, around 60% of voters used some form of paper ballots in the 2004 election, a percentage that has remained fairly constant since the 1980s.
Guest (R. Mercuri)
I found it interesting that the author chose to round down the Optical Scanner voting statistic from 39.8 (in the table) to 30% (in the article). Where I went to school, 39.8 rounds to 40%, but maybe thats not the way they do things at MIT. -) As it turns out, around 60% of voters used some form of paper ballots in the 2004 election, a percentage that has remained fairly constant since the 1980s.
Guest (Jack R)
I was suprised to discover that the idea of voting over the Web has not been included in a list of electronic voting options. It would seem that the technology to verify oneself against a federal and state database could be made available with current technology. Based on ones registration, the available voting list could be displayed. After submitting ones vote, the results could be checked and any questions answered before the final tally is made.
Guest (Owen N. Martinez)
Besides being more susceptible to tampering, electronic voting may scare a lot of voters that are not used to high technology, particularly minorities. I would recommend a mixed system, that will maintain a paper trail for good auditing of the election results, plus easy electronic voting, only after giving special training to voters about using high-tech voting machines.
Guest (R. Mercuri)
I found it interesting that the author chose to round down the Optical Scanner voting statistic from 39.8 (in the table) to 30% (in the article). Where I went to school, 39.8 rounds to 40%, but maybe thats not the way they do things at MIT. -) As it turns out, around 60% of voters used some form of paper ballots in the 2004 election, a percentage that has remained fairly constant since the 1980s.
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Guest (Jack R)
Voting over the Web
I was suprised to discover that the idea of voting over the Web has not been included in a list of electronic voting options. It would seem that the technology to verify oneself against a federal and state database could be made available with current technology. Based on ones registration, the available voting list could be displayed. After submitting ones vote, the results could be checked and any questions answered before the final tally is made.
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