A test above the Pacific Ocean early this month was characterized by a Pentagon official as a "huge step" in proving technologies to intercept long-range ballistic missiles, such as ones North Korea is developing. But some expert observers say it was unremarkable because it largely reiterated earlier achievements and did not--unlike some earlier tests--attempt to overcome potential counter-measures that an enemy could deploy. What's more, critics have expressed dismay about the classification of the test data, which makes it impossible to conduct an independent evaluation.
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An interceptor lifts off from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California on September 1. The Pentagon said it successfully hit a mock warhead target fired from a U.S. base in Kodiak, Alaska, several minutes earlier. But critics say the test was of limited usefulness, in part because, unlike earlier tests, it did not test the system’s ability to overcome simple counter-measures such as decoy warheads. (Credit: Missile Defense Agency)
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In the September 1 test, an interceptor launched from California's Vandenberg Air Force Base struck a mock warhead fired from Kodiak, Alaska. Similar tests in December 2004 and February 2005 had failed, prompting the U.S. Missile Defense Agency to suspend tests. But in this test, the interceptor hit the target, the agency said. The recent test also included a successful performance of radar-tracking and command elements, according to the agency, and was the first test-firing from the mainland United States. Previous interceptors had been fired from an atoll in the Marshall Islands.
"Basically, what we did today is a huge step in terms of our systematic approach to continuing to field, continuing to deploy, and continuing to develop a missile defense system for the United States, for our allies, our friends, our deployed forces around the world," said the director of the missile agency, Lt. Gen Henry "Trey" Obering, when announcing the results on September 1. If North Korea tried to fire a missile at the United States, he said, "we'd have a good chance" of shooting it down with existing technology.
The agency's ultimate goal is to deploy a "layered" defense that could stop all ranges of missiles, from short to intercontinental, in all phases of a missile's flight. The September 1 test was of ground-based systems that fire upon long-range missiles in their mid-course phase. Since the mid-1980s, the United States has spent more than $90 billion to develop missile-defense systems, and currently has a limited deployment of some pieces.
But critics argue that the recent test didn't address a potential Achilles Heel of long-range missile defense: how to differentiate a warhead from decoys that might be flying alongside it in the near-vacuum above the atmosphere.
"The issue has always been whether it can deal with countermeasures, and the issue most talked about is decoys," says George Lewis, a physicist at Cornell University. He notes that earlier tests tried to deal with decoys. "If you look at the progression: the first two tests [in the late 1990s] were not interception tests but had fairly sophisticated decoys, then we had the test where we were shooting at the warhead, plus a spherical balloon. Now we don't have any decoy. If anything, it looks like we are going backwards."
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Comments
rttedrow
09/14/2006
Posts:43
The issue with credible decoys is very dependent on the trajectory of the missile and the targeting mechanism employed. An ICBM with a 10-20 minute midcourse both has the throw weight and the time for deployment of a nasty range of simulants in both the optical and radar realm. Much of the analysis and testing on signatures all the way back to the late 1980s has centered on discovering, characterizing and defeating these countermeasures, and with substantive success.
IRBMs and smaller missiles on the other hand, have neither the time in trajectory nor the carrying capacity to release a challenging quantity of decoys of any credibility. The targeting system to intercept these shorter range (and quicker arriving) missiles needs to be developed to differentiate chaff, debris, and rocket parts from the payload, or to be able to attack the whole mess simultaneously. Once again, substantive progress has been made in this area in the last twenty years, mostly after the first Gulf War made clear that these signature-confusing items were an issue for the targeting radar used with Patriot (designed to attack easier air rather than missile targets).
Don't think that classifying research removes it from peer review. Practically everyone who actually UNDERSTANDS the intricacies of missile dynamics and operations is cleared, and there are sufficient rivalries within the industry as to approach and architecture that every valid criticism is made repeatedly within secure channels. The difference is that our adversaries don't have the open opportunity to use our own National internal dialog to explore and exploit weaknesses in our capability.
barrytilton
09/14/2006
Posts:5
Can we ever afford to field and maintain an effective system against a real and determined enemy? (China comes to mind)
Gurthang
09/14/2006
Posts:20
I believe that we are still in a position where a moderate (by USG standards) level of investment can keep us ahead of those forces now endeavoring to allow missiles to remain a threat. If we can deny long reach weapons effectiveness, then we can be fairly secure against attack by Government entities.
Many would point out that this does little against our current popular concern - terrorists. This is true, however terrorist threats, while horrible and VERY visible only impact relatively small populations. Even the 9/11 death toll of 3,000 is less than a tenth of the lowest estimate of that of Nagasaki. This crude (by today’s standards) bomb atop a strategic missile represents violence amongst the worst that a Nation-state can inflict on another. Eliminating this type of threat substantially improves the safety of the world, and is therefore worth quite a bit.
China's strategic goals don't include violent world domination - only regional superiority. As such, they are unlikely to invest in a fleet of missiles sufficient to overwhelm a moderate defense, as there is no strategic value in their eyes to doing so.
This being said, the level of investment in antimissile technology to stay ahead of our likely missile adversaries is much less, and is arguably worth the cost.
barrytilton
09/14/2006
Posts:5
Bernieklem
09/15/2006
Posts:1
In the first case, the missile defense system is useless, because a) any nation that would attack the USA could face annihilation - the good old fashioned mutually assured destruction (MAD) still holds...and b) any smart nation would use swarms of missiles and decoys, so in fact our missile defense system would be ineffective.
In the second case, terrorists don't have the technical know-how and physical resources to work with ballistic missiles. For the terrorist threat we don't need a missile defense system.
So this is just another giant, expensive yet useless military program.
We have become the slaves of the military-industrial complex.
gabrielg01
09/14/2006
Posts:405
A. The advisory believes you will destroy them in the event they strike.
B. The adversary fears the destruction.
C. The adversary believes that you will correctly identify them as the source of the strike
D. The adversary has concentrated assets (population, military, or industry) which can be destroyed effectively.
It is unreasonable to assume any of the above can be relied upon with current and future conflicts.
Given that the technology for missiles is spreading and becoming very available and the number and availability of missiles is also growing and that non-nation state combatants have access to large sums of money and the official or un-official support of nation states which have access to these missiles, claiming that terrorists will never obtain access to usable long range missiles is unreasonable.
I do grant that the systems currently being developed are unlikely to provide much protection against swarms of missiles sent out by a nation state. However there are very few nations capable of firing overwhelming numbers of long range missiles. Developing a system capable of handling a limited attack or an accidental launch is feasible. A working system can be expanded if the world situation warrants the expense.
jsessex
09/14/2006
Posts:13
jkaashoek
09/14/2006
Posts:1
The rationale for developing the system is as your opponent in this debate described. The reason NK is on the table right now is that the public requires a present example in order to understand the focus/purpose of long term needs.
How successful were efforts to focus the public on terrorists prior to 9/11. The probability of proliferation of missile capability into the hands of beligerent actors (NOT at the level of swarms, but of 1-5 at a time) is acknowledged as high by all aware of the international political realm, and our response is measured and appropriate.
barrytilton
09/15/2006
Posts:5
TahoeBlu
09/16/2006
Posts:1
If I'm worried about too much security on the trains, then there's always shipping it to the NYC port in a container.
Defeating these threats seems to be where we SHOULD be spending all that Star Wars money.
ms
09/18/2006
Posts:130
barrytilton
09/19/2006
Posts:5
It is widely known that our ports and borders are not secured. Only a fraction of the shipping containers gets screened.
Smuggling stuff first to Mexico, and then to the USA is a very doable plan. That's how tens of tons of drugs get in from South America.
So the concept is totally workable. Just because no one has done it so far, does not mean that no one will. There is always a first. Remember 9/11.
STAR WARS is just a self serving program for the defense contractors. It's a waste of our money.
gabrielg01
09/19/2006
Posts:405
jsessex
09/19/2006
Posts:13
A good analogy is a competent (not movie-style) martial artist. No one knows there is a Black or Red belt in the room until AFTER the individual has taken action deemed necessary to end the violence.
Gabriel should take all of this into account before lambasting the defense industry for building the systems the Government has determined are useful for our protection.
barrytilton
09/22/2006
Posts:5
I criticized the strategic choice of spending so much money on (questionable) ballistic defense, when in fact we are more likely to face attacks coming via low-tech delivery. We need to spend more money on developing our human intelligence capabilities.
We need to have a lot more spies out there. STAR WARS will not make us safer, when the Mexican border is wide open, and smugglers come and go as they wish.
gabrielg01
09/26/2006
Posts:405
My dad was just a risk assessment guy who worked for Boeing for 25 years. He played a major roll in getting the Chinook and the V-22 proposals out the door. He somehow passed on enough patriotism to me that I still get tingles in my spine when I sing the national anthem at the ballpark.
When it comes to foreign policy and military secrets I know enough to know that the media is covering all the wrong stories most of the time. I know that people that know these secrets like it this way but also want to pull their hair out at the ignorance that the media engenders. But my dad taught me that secrets are necessary. He was right.
It's just hard to trust the people that know these secrets and whose job it is to protect us in the best way possible. But the system seems to work. We are not quite dead yet. We are, in fact thriving quite well.
Even if these systems were useless, I would be in favour of developing them fully just to keep the defense industry up and on it's feet. History tells us that war is inevitable. What would we do if there was no defense industry there for us to fall back on when the next world war breaks out? What happens if the king of Saudi Arabia dies and the family of Saud breaks into factions? What if Saudi Arabia fell into civil war next week and oil jumped to 300 dollars a barrell?
There would be a wide range of missles to defend against in such a scenario. Some might even be nukes.
davidis1
04/06/2007
Posts:5