The Chinese Solar Machine Layer by Layer Fire in the Library The Mystery Behind Anesthesia
The last quarter-mile of Corey Lidle's fatal flight in Manhattan went unrecorded by radar. GPS technology could allow more precise accident reconstruction.
In the wake of the small-plane crash into a Manhattan apartment building last week, politicians and the public have focused on the potential dangers of unmonitored small-plane traffic around New York City.
But a technology question arises: Why don't these planes--which aren't required to carry "black box" voice and data recorders--at least required to save their GPS position information, for more accurate accident reconstruction?
The plane that crashed, killing N.Y. Yankees pitcher Corey Lidle and flight instructor Tyler Stanger, was last seen by conventional radar units about a quarter-mile away from the accident site, in the middle of a U-turn, at an altitude of about 500 feet, according to the National Transportation Safety Board. That leaves a lot of data missing about what happened in the final plunge before it exploded against the building.
Inexpensive equipment could fill that void.
John Hansman, professor of aeronautics at MIT and director of MIT's International Center for Air Transportation, discussed this and other crash-related issues with Technology Review.
Technology Review: What is the difference between radar and GPS in terms of the ability to record flight data?
John Hansman: Radar registers a plane's position every time the radar sweeps by, which is typically [every] four seconds. GPS typically calculates coordinates once per second. And at low altitudes, radar can be shielded by tall buildings. Radar doesn't actually measure altitude--it measures position--and the plane responds by reporting its altitude to the nearest 100 feet. GPS data on the plane can be accurate to a few feet. And it can be stored in the GPS unit on the plane. There is also an emerging system called Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) that would allow the GPS data to be broadcast and received by air-traffic controllers.
TR: What's the significance of that radar/GPS difference in terms of this crash?
JH: With GPS, you'd be able to better reconstruct what actually happened. Was he descending? Was he descending at a rate that was equivalent to having lost an engine? Was he turning? There's a lot of stuff they will get out of the forensics--how the propeller bends on impact depends on whether the plane's engine was working. But from GPS you could get more information on how the airplane was maneuvering prior to impact.
TR: Did the plane that crashed, a Cirrus SR20, carry any GPS equipment?
JH: Yes, it had a GPS that fed data into a multifunction moving map display (MFD). GPS trajectory storage is a function included in some GPS units. I am not sure what unit was on this aircraft, so it is hard to say exactly whether it had a GPS record. Apparently, in the NTSB briefing they did indicate that they had recovered a memory chip off the MFD. But I don't know what data was recorded on the chip and whether the data would have been wiped out during the crash. There is no requirement for flight-data record for general aviation, but investigators will take advantage of any evidence they can get.
TR: Do you think the FAA should require small planes to record their GPS data? It wouldn't be so expensive, would it?
JH: Take your garden-variety, hand-held GPS unit, and it can show you the track of where you have been. It doesn't take a lot of memory to record the coordinates of recent flights of an airplane. It has become very common to archive the trajectory data in memory. We do this sort of thing with cars now. We are naturally moving into an era where most accidents will be more accurately diagnosed with data residing in electronic systems.
What is happening now is there is a de facto move to have that capability onboard, because it is so cheap. However, if you make it a requirement, it would get complicated. You would require not only the memory, but some level of protection so the memory doesn't get burned, so it's survivable.
The article by David Talbot, titled “Tracking Small Planes with GPS”, was informative and interesting, but I feel it lacked the vital summary of the current position of the private aviation industry. The idea of placing GPS tracking and recording devices had been present in the private aviation industry for over 15 years; however, the main regulating body “FAA” has been hesitant about forcing any restrictions on private plane owners. A large percentage of private aviation occurs outside of large metropolitan areas, and as stated by the previous commenter, the FAA is deliberately slow in enforcing adoption, They are deliberately slow because they require, for their up and coming ADS-B system, a large supporting infrastructure which takes time to construct and because they are worried about opposition from and overburdening private plane owners. For these reasons, a “final ruling by the FAA isn’t due on such a system until 2009.”
So could technology come to the rescue of these pilots? The answer is a definite yes, but the main questions becomes, “Is it worth forcing GPS enabled tracking on the populace of private pilots when only a very small percentage of planes are crashing?” Only time and more accidents will tell; however, the options are many, from limiting entrance into GPS enabled airspaces to all out enforcement of GPS enabled tracking ADS-B systems.
www.techrd.com
Brian Glassman
Innovation Management
Commercialization of technology
Thanks to David Talbot for so many excellent articles. I think all planes should be required to have equipment for GPS location and be able to receive verbal instructions from the military or airport flight control. I was told by a nuclear plant senior employee that all U.S. nuclear power plants have a 10 mile no-fly zone. It apears obvious they are vulnerable to attack via airplane. A solution to this problem would be pilotless drone planes continually circling above the 10 mile no-fly zone with radar that could warn them of approaching planes. I would think that the drones could be controlled by the closest Air Force base, and if necessary prevent repeatedly warned planes from flying into the no-fly zone. They can't be warned if they have no reliable ways to warn them. Such communication capability should be required on all planes. I would feel much safer if nuclear power plants and nuclear waste fuel storage facilities could be protected in this way.
In the two incidents since 9/11 where a small General Aviation airplane hit a large building, the score is Buildings 2, Airplanes 0. The notion that Nuclear Power Plants are in any danger whatsoever from GA aircraft is not supported by reason. We shouldn't waste a penny with ludicrous ideas like protecting tons of concrete--aka a nuclear power plant--from the approximately 2400 pounds of a thin-skinned GA single-engine airplane.
I wish I could agree. Small planes can carry nuclear bombs that could land on nuclear power plants and or their waste fuel storage facilities. The fuel rods at the storage facilities contain cesium 137 that has a half-life of 30 years, is radioactive for 60 years. Most of these facilities contain many more rods than they were built to contain; many store the rods in pools of water. Each such storage facility holds in the neighborhood of 5-12 times the radiation Chernobyl released. Please check out this subject at BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS.
ADS-B....Terrorist's Dream, Security's Nightmare
Must reading for JH and anyone interested in "the rest of the story" is found at http://www.airsport-corp.com/adsb2.htm
A lengthy article with lots of supplemental information.
Manufacturing in the United States is in trouble. That's bad news not just for the country's economy but for the future of innovation.
wiley42
1 Comment
Citation, please?
Could we get a citation for "...The FAA is requiring ADS-B in the next 5 or 6 years..."? NPRM isn't due until Feb 2007, final rule isn't due until 2009 and the in-service decision isn't due until late 2010 with 100% avionics deployment by 2020 -- and the FAA is floating those dates only if users of the NAS don't demonstrate active opposition to "avionics related airspace mandates". There's also the unresolved issue of NAS performance failure if the satelite source is used as the sole means of providing ADS-B and a collection of smaller issues revolving around supplier base, spectrum occupancy and a lack of practical experience with TSO-C166A.
All of this stuff (and more) was in the 28 Aug 06 presentation from the FAA; you can find it and more the FAA ads-b website, www.adsb.gov.
Reply