The State of Bioweapons
Mark Williams's piece on the dangers of biotechnology is an excellent summary of the current tensions ("The Knowledge," March/April 2006). Today's scientists have the responsibility to consider the possible abuse of biotechnological advance for hostile purposes, but they need not reinvent the wheel. In my 2005 book, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, I analyze the different historical restraints that have prevented the use of biological weapons despite nearly a century of available technology and development. Why the large state programs, with the exception of the Japanese from 1940 to 1943, refrained from using germ weapons is a deep subject. I agree with Williams that the threat of advances in this area of science is real and that scientists need to be more aware of potential dangers, as well as threats to openness in research. The multiple layers of secrecy surrounding the state programs of the last century (and some in this century) increased risks to civilians. What members of the public do not know can hurt them. Jeanne Guillemin
Senior fellow
MIT Security Studies Program
Cambridge, MA

You conclude your excellent explanation of why you decided to publish "The Knowledge" by stating, "Our best hope of countering the threat is to invest in research that will suggest a technological solution" ("From the Editor," March/April 2006). I could not disagree more. We are surrounded by serious problems for which technological solutions exist but are not employed. One needs only to consider how our dependence on petroleum might be reduced simply by raising the fuel efficiency standards for automobiles. Our best hope of countering the threat of bioweapons is to invest in research that will suggest a social solution.
David Nasatir
Berkeley, CA