TECHNOLOGY AND IRAQ

As a retired U.S. Navy officer and a communications subspecialist, I have an issue with the title of your article about the U.S. military's use of high-tech communications systems in Iraq ("How Tech Failed in Iraq," TR November 2004). Technology did not fail; some systems and equipment failed. There were inadequate channels, or the equipment was misdeployed. That doesn't mean the technology failed -- only that different equipment should have been used. The article indicated that at the battle of Objective Peach, "old-fashioned training, better firepower, superior equipment, air support, and enemy incompetence" were the factors involved in the decimation of the Iraqi forces. However, it should be kept in mind that current "oldfashioned" training is the result of technological advances: better fi repower, superior equipment, and air support capabilities. These factors improved and enhanced results, which made the enemy appear incompetent, as they were not at the same technological level. To imply that the technology failed is misleading.
Lt. Comdr. Howard B. Mirkin
U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Bangkok, Thailand

Thank you for closing the article as you did -- with the reminder that ultimately, it is physical armor, not information, that is needed to protect troops in the fi eld. I served in the active component as an armor officer and am now a reserve-component officer (quartermaster) running an IT consulting business. I was taught that nothing will ever replace boots on the ground. The intellectual debates between advances in technology and the need for ground troops who close with the enemy -- a phrase common to all combat-arms missions -- have gone on since the beginning of warfare. The comment about the alpha geeks and breakdown in command and control during the Iraq War led me to believe that a change in the organizational structure of military command might be favored.
Capt. Paul E. Lima
U.S. Army Reserve
Collegeville, PA