GARBAGE IN, GRAGBEA OTU In 1974 Francis Ford Coppola wrote
and directed The Conversation, which
starred Gene Hackman as Harry Caul,
a socially maladroit surveillance expert. In
this remarkably prescient movie, a mysterious organization hires Caul to record
a quiet discussion that will take place in
the middle of a crowd in San Francisco's
Union Square. Caul deploys three microphones: one in a bag carried by a confederate and two directional mikes
installed on buildings overlooking the
area. Afterward Caul discovers that each
of the three recordings is plagued by
background noise and distortions, but
by combining the different sources, he is
able to piece together the conversation.
Or, rather, he thinks he has pieced it
together. Later, to his horror, Caul learns that he misinterpreted a crucial line, a discovery that leads directly to the movie's
chilling denouement.
The Conversation illustrates a central dilemma for tomorrow's surveillance
society. Although much of the explosive
growth in monitoring is being driven by
consumer demand, that growth has not
yet been accompanied by solutions to
the classic difficulties computer systems
have integrating disparate sources of
information and arriving at valid conclusions. Data quality problems that cause
little inconvenience on a local scale—
when Wal-Mart's smart shelves misread a
razor's radio frequency identification
tag—have much larger consequences
when organizations assemble big databases from many sources and attempt to
draw conclusions about, say, someone's
capacity for criminal action. Such problems, in the long run, will play a large role
in determining both the technical and
social impact of surveillance.
The experimental and controversial
Total Information Awareness program of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency exemplifies these issues. By merging records from corporate,medical,retail,
educational, travel, telephone, and even
veterinary sources, as well as such "biometric"data as fingerprints,iris and retina
scans, DNA tests, and facial-characteristic
measurements,the program is intended to
create an unprecedented repository of
information about both U.S. citizens and
foreigners with U.S. contacts. Program
director John M. Poindexter has explained that analysts will use custom data-mining
techniques to sift through the mass of
information, attempting to "detect, classify, and identify foreign terrorists" in
order to "preempt and defeat terrorist
acts"—a virtual Eye of Sauron, in critics'
view, constructed from telephone bills
and shopping preference cards.
In February Congress required the
Pentagon to obtain its specific approval
before implementing Total Information
Awareness in the United States (though
certain actions are allowed on foreign
soil). But President George W. Bush had
already announced that he was creating
an apparently similar effort, the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center, to be led by the
Central Intelligence Agency. Regardless of
the fate of these two programs, other
equally sweeping attempts to pool monitoring data are proceeding apace.Among
these initiatives is Regulatory DataCorp,
a for-profit consortium of 19 top financial institutions worldwide. The consortium, which was formed last July,
combines members' customer data in an
effort to combat "money laundering,
fraud, terrorist financing, organized
crime, and corruption." By constantly
poring through more than 20,000 sources
of public information about potential
wrongdoings—from newspaper articles
and Interpol warrants to disciplinary
actions by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission—the consortium's Global Regulatory Information
Database will, according to its owner,
help clients "know their customers."
Equally important in the long run
are the databases that will be created by
the nearly spontaneous aggregation of
scores or hundreds of smaller databases.
"What seem to be small-scale, discrete
systems end up being combined into large
databases," says Marc Rotenberg, executive
director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,a nonprofit research organization in Washington, DC. He points to
the recent, voluntary efforts of merchants
in Washington's affluent Georgetown district. They are integrating their in-store
closed-circuit television networks and making the combined results available to
city police. In Rotenberg's view, the collection and consolidation of individual
surveillance networks into big government and industry programs "is a strange
mix of public and private, and it's not
something that the legal system has
encountered much before."
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